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We the People, They the People, and the Puzzle of
Democratic Constitutionalism
David A. Strauss*
I.

The Illusion of "We the People"

The Constitution, of course, announces that it has been "ordain[ed] and
The idea that the Constitution is
establish[ed]" by "We the People."'
somehow the work of "the people"-that it has a meaningful democratic
pedigree-is very appealing. But in what sense is the Constitution we live
under today the product of "we the people"?
There are several issues. One is that the individuals responsible for the
original Constitution may not have been so representative of the people even
of their time.2 Then there is the familiar problem that, even assuming the text
was the work of the people at some point, those people (leaving aside the
most recent amendments) have not been around for a while. But we are still
bound by their handiwork in some ways-which means we are talking about
they the people, not we the people, and that does not sound very democratic. 3
A third question concerns the ways in which we have departed from what the
ratifying and amending generations wanted to do. That means we are
arguably acting inconsistently with what we the people ordained and
established. But maybe those departures make the Constitution more
democratic; I will suggest that, potentially at least, they do. Finally, there is
the question why it matters whether the Constitution is democratic. Ormaybe this is another way of asking the same question-what sense of
"democratic" would make it a good thing for the Constitution to be
democratic.

* Gerald Ratner Distinguished Service Professor of Law, the University of Chicago. This
Essay was written for the Symposium on Constitutional Foundations, held at The University of
Texas School of Law on February 15-16, 2013. I am grateful to the participants in the symposium
and the audience members for their comments, and to the Burton and Adrienne Glazov Faculty
Fund at the University of Chicago Law School for financial support.
1. U.S. CONST. pmbl.
2. See, e.g., Larry G. Simon, The Authority of the Framers of the Constitution: Can Originalist

Interpretation Be Justified?, 73 CALIF. L. REv. 1482, 1498 n.44, 1499-1500 & n.48 (1985)
(estimating that, because only property-holding adult white males were enfranchised, and not all of
them supported ratification, only 2.5% of the population of the United States at the time voted in
favor of ratifying the Constitution).
3. Of course, the Constitution can be amended, see U.S. CONST. art. V, but a proposed
amendment can be blocked even by a small minority-just over one-third of either House of
Congress (unless two-thirds of the states call for a convention), or just over one-fourth of the states.
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I will try to answer these questions for a system of common law
constitutionalism. I believe that is our system; but even if it is not, or to the
extent it is not, I think we can make headway with these questions by
considering them in connection with such a system. The idea of common
law constitutionalism is that we resolve controversial questions of
constitutional law not by examining the text of the Constitution but on the
basis of precedents, both judicial and non-judicial, combined with judgments
of fairness and good policy-just as common law judges decide questions on
those bases.4 For controversial constitutional issues, the text plays a limited
role.
Any frequently litigated constitutional provision will serve as an
example. The modal Supreme Court opinion quotes the language of the
provision, but then, without any further attention to the language, says
something like "We have interpreted this provision to mean. . . ." Then

there follows an extended discussion of the precedents. If there is any room
to maneuver, the Court shapes the law established by the precedents
according to its ideas about what is fair or what makes sense. 6 For lower
courts, the emphasis on precedent is, if anything, even greater, because they
are bound by the decisions of the Supreme Court and often of their circuit.
Also, just as the common law was not concerned with judicial precedents
alone-legislation, custom, and even general trends in society were all part
of what common law judges considered ' -so too common law constitutionalism is concerned with non-judicial, as well as judicial, precedent.8
4. For a description and defense of common law constitutionalism, see generally DAVID A.
STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION (2010) and David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional
Interpretation,63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877 (1996).
5. See, e.g., Snyder v. Phelps, 131 S. Ct. 1207, 1215-19 (2011) (quoting the text of the Free
Speech Clause of the First Amendment but then discussing numerous precedents without any
further reference to the text).
6. See id. at 1220 (asserting that "hurtful speech on public issues" must be protected "to ensure
that we do not stifle public debate").
7. See BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, Adherence to Precedent: The Subconscious Element in the
Judicial Process, in THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 142 (1921). Judge Cardozo noted

that:
[W]hen the law has left the situation uncovered by any pre-existing rule, there
is nothing to do except to have [the judge] declare what fair and reasonable
men, mindful of the habits of life of the community, and of the standards of
justice and fair dealing prevalent among them, ought in such circumstances to
do, with no rules except those of custom and conscience to regulate their
conduct.
Id at 142-43.
8. For an example of an argument based primarily on non-judicial precedent, see the opinions
of the Office of Legal Counsel of the United States Department of Justice concluding that the
President may make appointments under the Recess Appointments Clause during an intrasession
recess of Congress. The most recent opinion, citing others, is Lawfulness of Recess Appointments
During a Recess of the Senate Notwithstanding Periodic Pro Forma Sessions, 36 Op. O.L.C. at 5-9
This position was
(Jan. 6, 2012), http://justice.gov/olc/2012/pro-forma-sessions-opinion.pdf.
disapproved by the District of Columbia Circuit in Noel Canning v. NLRB, 705 F.3d 490, 499-507
(D.C. Cir. 2013). Contra, Evans v. Stephens, 387 F.3d 1220, 1224-26 (1lth Cir. 2004) (holding
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To be clear, the claim about common law constitutionalism is not that
the text of the Constitution plays no role. It is a fixed point of our
constitutional system that the text cannot be ignored. 9 No one can claim that
the Constitution requires or forbids something without citing a provision of
the Constitution that supports the claim. It is also not acceptable to say that
some provision of the Constitution is obsolete and so should be disregarded
(in the way that a precedent might be outdated and should be overruled).
Beyond that role, there are ways in which the text is very important, but in
noncontroversial areas: the text can settle things that need to be settled, one
way or another. It is important that we know when a President's term of
office ends, for example. It could be very disruptive if we had to resolve that
question on a case-by-case basis.
Fixed aspects of the Constitution-provisions that are clear and not
subject to serious dispute-raise their own interesting issues about
democracy. You could certainly ask, to take a prominent example, in what
sense the continued existence of the Senate is democratic.10 But at least as
far as the courts are concerned, questions about the democratic nature of
constitutionalism usually arise when there is a dispute about what the
Constitution requires-instances in which, for example, the courts have
struck down laws that have significant popular support." The problem
seems to be particularly acute for common law constitutionalism, because the
common law, as it developed in England and the United States, was,
generally speaking, subordinate to legislation. It could be objected that using
a common law approach to constitutional law presents special problems of
democratic legitimacy because-in contrast to the familiar uses of the
common law-common law constitutionalism allows common law judging
to override the work of elected legislatures. 12
that the recess of the Senate, within the meaning of the Recess Appointments Clause, includes an
intrasession recess).
9. See Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding,60 B.U. L. REV.
204, 205 (1980) ("The text of the Constitution is authoritative, but many of its provisions are treated
as inherently open-textured."); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist Coherence Theory of
ConstitutionalInterpretation,100 HARV. L. REV. 1189, 1195 (1987) ("Arguments from text play a
universally accepted role in constitutional debate.").
10. See, e.g., SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION: WHERE THE
CONSTITUTION GOES WRONG (AND How WE THE PEOPLE CAN CORRECT IT) 49-62 (2006) (noting
the disproportionate power of small states in the Senate and concluding that "there is simply no
defense for this other than the fact that equal representation of the states was thought necessary in
1787 to create a Constitution that would be ratified by the small states," and that the current division
of power in the Senate "has literally nothing to do with measuring national majority sentiment").
11. See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 913 (2010) (invalidating part of the
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act on First Amendment grounds); United States v. Morrison, 529
U.S. 598, 602, 605 (2000) (striking down the federal civil remedies portion of the Violence Against
Women Act); see also Richard H. Pildes, Is the Supreme Court a "Majoritarian"Institution?,2010
SUP. CT. REV. 103, 105 ("Judged in any number of ways, Citizens United appears to be the most
countermajoritarian act of the Court in many decades.").
12. For an objection along these lines, see, for example, JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 54 (2011) (asserting that common law constitutionalism "offers no account of why judicial
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I think this particular objection is based on an illusion, although that is
not to deny that one can raise questions about whether common law
constitutionalism is sufficiently democratic. The illusion derives from the
allure of "we the people." If constitutionalism includes judicial review-if
judges who are not politically accountable can refuse to enforce laws enacted
by elected representatives-then there is an issue about whether
constitutionalism is undemocratic.13 That issue arises because judges, who
are less accountable to the electorate, are undoing the work of
representatives, who are more accountable.1 4 The issue about democracy is
an artifact of judicial review, not of a common law approach to the
Constitution. Why does it matter whether the unelected judges are enforcing
commands put into place by the people who drafted the Constitution a
century or more ago, or applying precedent, or for that matter just enforcing
their own policy preferences? Unelected judges are thwarting elected
officials. That raises the question about democracy.
The illusion is that a common law approach to the Constitution is more
undemocratic than enforcing the text of the Constitution because the text of
the Constitution is the product of we the people and therefore has a
democratic pedigree.' 5 So when the courts enforce it, they are just enforcing
the will of the people; they are not acting undemocratically. This kind of
argument is familiar from Hamilton's FederalistNo. 78. Hamilton rejected
the "imagination" that giving courts the power to strike down statutes "would
imply a superiority of the judiciary to the legislative power."' 6 Rather,
Hamilton said, the power of judicial review was just a way of vindicating the
principle that "the representatives of the people" cannot be "superior to the
people themselves."' The courts "were designed to be an intermediate body
between the people and the legislature in order, among other things, to keep
the latter within the limits assigned to their authority." 8 Giving this power to
the courts does not "by any means suppose a superiority of the judicial to the
legislative power." 9 Rather, Hamilton concluded that it "only supposes that
the power of the people is superior to both, and that where the will of the
legislature, declared in its statutes, stands in opposition to that of the people,

decisionmaking ... has any connection to popular sovereignty" because "[j]udges are professional
elites, and the precedents of previous judges are the decisions of past elites").
13. This is, of course, a persistent theme, but probably the best known discussion is ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 16-23 (1962).
14. Id. at 16-17.
15. See, e.g., BALKIN, supra note 12 (asserting that judges who use a common law approach to
the Constitution "are not engaged in constitutional construction that implements a written plan
adopted by We the People; rather they are creating the Constitution through familiar common law
methods").
16. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 465 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
17. Id at 466.
18. Id.
19. Id.
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declared in the Constitution, the judges ought to be governed by the latter
rather than the former." 2 0
If we were dealing with a recently adopted constitutional provisionone adopted by we the people, not they the people-then this argument
would be plausible. The will of the people, expressed in a recent
amendment, should prevail over the will of the legislature. Of course matters
are not so simple, even with respect to recently adopted provisions. No one
doubts that the Constitution prevails over ordinary statutes; the questions are
always about the proper interpretation of the Constitution. But the main
point is that the written Constitution we actually have, including the
amendments that give rise to the most litigation, was, as I said, adopted by a
long-dead generation. Hamilton's people, at this point in history, are they the
people, not we the people. So it is not clear why judicial review that is based
on the text is more democratic than judicial review based on precedent.
II.

How Common Law Constitutionalism Can Be Democratic

Assuming, though, that judicial review is to some degree undemocratic,
we should still care about how undemocratic it is. It might still be a good
thing for judicial enforcement of the Constitution to be able to claim some
form of democratic legitimacy-of responsiveness to we the people. But
what might democracy mean in this context?
Even if democracy just means some version of majority rule, there are
difficult problems, of course. We have to decide how the views of the
majority will be determined. If there is a system of representation, how are
the representatives chosen-are they elected from districts or at large from
the nation? If they are elected from districts, how are those districts
identified? What are the representatives' terms of office? There are also
questions about how citizens' votes are aggregated. Does the system use
proportional representation, or "first past the post" voting, or a requirement
of a majority vote, with a runoff if necessary? What roles do political parties
play, in and outside the representative assembly? How is the agenda set in
the representative assemblies? Are the assemblies unicameral or bicameral?
Is the executive separate from the legislature? And then there are crucial
questions about the process surrounding the voting: questions about, for
example, the scope of free speech and regulation of the means of influencing
votes, such as financial contributions and expenditures.
The multiplicity of these questions, and the difficulty of answering
them, show that it is not obvious what constitutes a truly democratic system
of government. That alone should cause us to hesitate about contrasting
"democratic" elected government with "undemocratic" judicial review.
Having said that, however, in a system with something like judicial review,
there will be elements that are avowedly undemocratic in the sense that they

20. Id.
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are not subject to the usual majoritarian processes. Judges are insulated from
popular opinion: federal judges, at least, are appointed, not elected, and they
"hold their Offices during good Behavior." 21 Conventional understandings,
not spelled out in the Constitution, would condemn a judge who viewed
herself simply as an agent of popular will.
Still, though, rather than describing judicial review as "countermajoritarian" 22-as if it were the antithesis of democratic government-it
might be better to say that there is a continuum. Life-tenured judges are
different from elected representatives, of course, but if you think about a
representative who has a safe seat, and whose chances of losing an election
are therefore minimal, or a representative who does not plan to run for
reelection, the differences with judges-as far as democratic credentials are
concerned-are not so stark. Perhaps more important, all representatives are
insulated to a degree; some of them (such as United States Senators) serve
relatively long terms of office, 23 and there is no understanding that representatives must respond to every twist and turn of constituent opinion.24 That
suggests that a good constitutional order has elements that are highly
responsive to popular opinion and elements that are designed to be less
responsive.25 In that sense, any plausible constitutional system is, to some
degree, undemocratic.
When courts override the elected branches in the name of the
Constitution-whether they use a common law approach or something elsethey are doing something undemocratic in this sense. But because any
plausible constitutional order has some undemocratic elements, that alone
does not call judicial review into question. The important questions about
constitutional interpretation and judicial review concern the nature and extent
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
22. See BICKEL, supra note 13 (discussing the "root difficulty" of judicial review's "countermajoritarian" nature).
23. See LEVINSON, supra note 10, at 50 ("I suspect that the country has probably been reasonably well served by the six-year term. It encourages taking a more long-term view than do members
of the House, who are constantly aware that they will face a new election literally within twentytwo months of taking their oaths of office."); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn,
21.

Constitutional Horticulture: Deliberation-RespectingJudicial Review, 87 TEXAS L. REv. 1273,

1281 (2009) (noting that "the Senate, with long terms and statewide districts, is expected to be a
'select and stable' body").
24. See Andrew Rehfeld, Representation Rethought: On Trustees, Delegates, and Gyroscopes
in the Study of PoliticalRepresentation and Democracy, 103 AM. POL. SCI. REv. 214, 214 (2009)

(remarking that "[n]o one expects there to be an exact correspondence" between the laws of a nation
and the preferences of the citizens governed by them because citizens' preferences are not coherent
at "the individual [and] collective levels," may not correspond to their "true interests," and might be
trumped by "more important principles" such as minority rights).
25. See Eskridge & Ferejohn, supra note 23 (arguing that "each part of the lawmaking process
plays a different deliberative role," with the House of Representatives being "most responsive to
popular attitudes and demands" and the Senate "apply[ing] longer term considerations of 'reason
and justice' to measures urgently sought by the House"); cf James E. Fleming, Toward a More
Democratic Congress?, 89 B.U. L. REV. 629, 640 (2009) (concluding "attempts to make Congress
more democratic" would not fix the institution's problems).
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of these undemocratic elements. What is the role of these (relatively)
undemocratic institutions? Should the courts intervene only on behalf of
certain minorities? On behalf of some supposedly enduring national values
or traditions? On behalf of principles supposedly encoded in the text of the
Constitution? The interventions will, in a sense, be undemocratic, but that is
not necessarily a problem. In fact, it may be a good thing.
I do not think we should stop there, though. There should be some way
to show that constitutionalism, including judicial review, is democratic. That
is, there should be some account of how the Constitution that is enforced
against majoritarian institutions is the work of we the people. But the
account should be a realistic one that does not pretend we are the same
people we were 220 or 150 years ago.
Before I try to give such an account, it is worth addressing a theory that
seems to solve this whole problem neatly. The theory is usually called
dualist democracy.2 6 The idea is that the Constitution is actually a product of
a democratic process that is superior to ordinary day-to-day majoritarian
processes.2 7 The ordinary processes are more heavily influenced by interest
groups or elites-not truly by the people, who are engaged more with their
own lives and not so much with the business of government. 28 But from time
to time, according to this theory, the people are mobilized, and that enables a
superior democratic sensibility to prevail. 2 9 The Constitution, on this view, is

26. The best-known contemporary statements are in 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE:
FOUNDATIONS 6-7 (1991) [hereinafter ACKERMAN, FOUNDATIONS], which differentiates between

rare decisions made by the people-"higher lawmaking"-and decisions made more frequently by
the government-"normal lawmaking"-and 2 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE:
TRANSFORMATIONS 5 (1998) [hereinafter ACKERMAN, TRANSFORMATIONS], which describes

higher lawmaking as taking place under a "heightened sense of democratic legitimacy" and normal
lawmaking as the "countless decisions made in the absence of mobilized and politically selfconscious majority sentiment." See also the discussion of the dualist nature of constitutional
democracy in JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 231-33 (expanded ed. 2005), which traces the

central idea to John Locke's Two Treatises of Government, and refers to "Locke's distinction ...
between the people's constituent power to establish a new regime and the ordinary power of officers
of government and the electorate exercised in day-to-day politics."
27. See ACKERMAN, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 26, at 6 (arguing that the Constitution "accords
to decisions made by the People" only when an "extraordinary number" of citizens take a proposal
seriously, opponents of the decision have "a fair opportunity to organize," and a majority of
Americans "support [the] initiative as its merits are discussed, time and again, in the deliberative
fora provided for 'higher lawmaking"'). For a somewhat similar account, see KEITH E.
WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL MEANING, ORIGINAL INTENT, AND

JUDICIAL REvIEw 110-59 (1999).

See, e.g., id. at 151 ("The formation of the Constitution

depended on popular deliberation, and it was drafted and ratified on the basis of the persuasion of
the whole, not the assertion of a part.").
28. See ACKERMAN, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 26, at 243-51 (identifying bureaucrats, public

and private interest groups, the mass media, and political parties as the primary vehicles of normal
politics).
29. See id at 266-67 (describing a period of "mobilized popular deliberation" in which a
"movement's transformative proposals are tested time and again within the higher lawmaking
system").
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the product of these periods.30 Judges should treat as the Constitution the
decisions that are the product of these heightened periods of popular political
engagement, the so-called constitutional moments. 3 1
In American history, the framing of the written Constitution was one
such constitutional moment, but it was not the only one. The other usual
candidates are the period after the Civil War and the New Deal.3 2 We need
some criterion to determine when constitutional moments have occurred, and
we need a way of identifying the decisions that are going to be attributed to
these periods of heightened engagement. Then those decisions, being truly
the decisions of we the people, can, according to the theory of dualist
democracy, be enforced during normal times, against the less fully
democratic decisions of the interest groups and the elites.
This theory solves the problem of the supposedly undemocratic nature
of judicial review by echoing Hamilton's discussion in FederalistNo. 78.34
When judges enforce the Constitution, they are vindicating, not defeating, the
true will of the people. That is because the true will of the people is
expressed in the decisions made during constitutional moments, not in the
day-to-day product of the political system. Judges invalidate the latter when
it is inconsistent with the former.
I do not think this theory works, for several reasons. There is the
problem of identifying the periods of superior democratic engagement. It is
not obvious that things like, for example, higher voting turnout or greater
participation in political organizations should be enough to establish greater
democratic legitimacy in the sense we need. The theory would have to
identify, with specificity, the problems that afflict normal majoritarian
processes and then show how those problems are overcome when certain
That kind of demonstration presents serious
conditions are present.
normative and empirical difficulties-normative issues about what kind of
citizen participation brings about the superior democratic deliberations and
empirical issues about the circumstances that will produce that kind of
30. See id. at 267 (describing the final phase of higher lawmaking, legal codification, in which
"the Supreme Court begins the task of translating constitutional politics into constitutional law,
supplying the cogent doctrinal principles that will guide normal politics for many years to come").
31. See Bruce A. Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 93 YALE L.J.

1013, 1022 (1984) ("Although constitutional politics is the highest kind of politics, it should be
permitted to dominate the nation's life only during rare periods of heightened political
consciousness. During the long periods between these constitutional moments, a second form of
activity-I shall call it normal politics-prevails." (emphasis added)).
32. See, e.g., ACKERMAN, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 26, at 58 (identifying the "three great

turning points of constitutional history" as the Founding, Reconstruction, and the New Deal).
33. See id. at 6-7 (outlining "the basic idea" of a dualist democracy as one where normal
lawmaking occasionally cedes to higher lawmaking by which a mobilized populace signals to their
government "new marching orders," finally "culminat[ing] in the proclamation of higher law in the
name of We the People").
34. See THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 16, at 466 (asserting that
"the courts were designed to be an intermediate body between the people and the legislature in
order, among other things, to keep the latter within the limits assigned to their authority").
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participation. The circumstances that cause people to get highly engaged in
politics might not be conducive to higher quality decision making." In fact,
the opposite might be true: periods of crisis might precipitate a lot of political
engagement but also bring out the worst in people.
But even if it were possible to identify constitutional moments in the
past when the authentic will of the people was expressed, dualist democracy
would still not make judicial review democratic.3 6 For one thing, unless the
constitutional moments were in the recent past, it is still they the people, not
we the people. The youngest person who voted for Franklin Roosevelt in
1936 is 98 years old today.3 7 Being ruled by the decisions of the New Deal
generation is not particularly democratic.
And even apart from that difficulty-and again assuming we have
identified genuine constitutional moments-there is the problem of figuring
out what decisions were made by "the people" during those periods. That
problem is hard enough when the constitutional moment produces a fullblown written Constitution, together with extensive records of drafting and
ratification debates. Even when we have those materials, there is often no
consensus on what the people decided during the constitutional moment: we
have the familiar debates about the original understandings. When the
process is not that explicit-when no canonical text emerges from the
constitutional moment-we have to determine what decisions to attribute to a
people who were no doubt divided on many issues, had multifarious
concerns, and probably did not realize that they were engaged in a form of
constitution making. That determination will not be easy. It will have to be
made by someone-a judge, for example. And that just reproduces the same
problem about the democratic basis of judicial review.3 8
Finally, dualist democracy is, I think, not an accurate description of our
system. Many major constitutional developments did not emerge all at once
as the product of something that could plausibly be described as a unified set
of decisions by a politically engaged population. Those developments came
about over time, often in fits and starts. It is not possible, for example, to
identify a two- or three- or five- or even ten-year period in which racial
equality emerged as a governing principle in American constitutional law;
35. See, e.g., Jon Elster, The Optimal Design of a Constituent Assembly, in COLLECTIVE
WISDOM: PRINCIPLES AND MECHANISMS 148, 149 (H616ne Landemore & Jon Elster eds., 2012)

("Actual constitution making is often a messy business, triggered by crises of one kind or another
and rarely governed by the 'calm, sedate medium of reason."').
36. See, e.g., Michael J. Klarman, ConstitutionalFact/ConstitutionalFiction: A Critique of
Bruce Ackerman's Theory of Constitutional Moments, 44 STAN. L. REV. 759, 765 (1992) (book

review) (arguing that a proponent of dualist democracy "cannot make a principled choice between
the disinterested voice of a People long since dead and the voice of today's living stand-ins").
37. Interview by Ray Suarez with Elzena Johnson, Delegate to the 2012 Democratic Nat'l
Convention, in Charlotte, N.C. (Sept. 6, 2012), available at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/
politics/july-decl2/elzena_09-06.html.
38. See, e.g., Klarman, supra note 36, at 770 ("Even having established that a constitutional
moment had occurred, courts ... would still need to ascertain its content.").
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there were important antecedents to the 1954 decision in Brown v. Board of
Education39 (including the post-Civil War period, of course, as well as events
in the twentieth century), and the Civil Rights Act of 1964 hardly marked the
end of the process.4 0 The same is true of freedom of speech, 4' women's
equality, 4 2 the growth of the administrative state, 43 the expansion of federal
power over the national economy,44 and the emergence of presidential dominance in national security affairs.
It is not realistic to attribute these
developments to a single decisive act (or a closely related set of decisive
acts) by the electorate. These constitutional developments were the product
of a much more evolutionary process.
Is there, then, a meaningful way in which a constitution that is enforced
against majoritarian decisions can be called democratic? As I said, I will
consider a common law constitutional system, although I think the argument
has application beyond that. For the sake of exposition, I will consider a
simple model that seems relatively undemocratic: constitutional principles
are developed through judicial precedent alone and then used, by federal
judges, to invalidate laws enacted by Congress and state legislatures. I
should emphasize that this is not the whole of common law
constitutionalism. Other actors besides judges-legislators, executive branch
officials, and citizens-rely on precedent too. And judges (as well as these
other actors) invoke non-judicial precedent, not just the work of judges. But
common law constitutionalism is at its most undemocratic when judges rely
on judicial precedent alone. So if that kind of system is sufficiently
democratic, it follows a fortiori that common law constitutionalism as a
whole is adequately democratic.

39. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
40. See STRAUSS, supra note 4, at 85-92 (discussing how earlier events influenced the Court's
decision in Brown); see generally Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., From Dred Scott to Barack Obama: The

Ebb and Flow ofRace Jurisprudence,25 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 1 (2009) (describing events and
landmark Supreme Court cases concerning racial equality from the mid- 1800s to present).
41. See David A. Strauss, Freedom of Speech and the Common-Law Constitution, in ETERNALLY VIGILANT: FREE SPEECH INTHE MODERN ERA 33 (Lee C. Bollinger & Geoffrey R. Stone

eds., 2002) (attributing the current state of free speech law to an evolution arising from "judicial
decisions and extrajudicial developments").
42. See, e.g., Reva B. Siegel, She The People: The Nineteenth Amendment, Sex Equality, Federalism, and the Family, 115 HARV. L. REv. 947 (2002) (grounding ratification of the Nineteenth

Amendment in a history that began with the drafting of the Fourteenth Amendment).
43. See generally STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, BUILDING A NEW AMERICAN STATE: THE EXPAN-

SION OF NATIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITIES 1877-1920 (1982) (describing the creation and

growth of federal administrative agencies).
44. See, e.g., Larry Kramer, What's a ConstitutionFor Anyway? Of History and Theory, Bruce

Ackerman and The New Deal, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 885, 921 (1996) ("The New Deal called for
a significant expansion of federal authority, to be sure, but from a constitutional perspective, the
increase was quantitative rather than qualitative.").
45. For a comprehensive discussion, see David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chiefat the Lowest Ebb-A ConstitutionalHistory, 121 HARV. L. REV. 941 (2008).
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There are at least three ways in which such a judge-centric system,
contrary to appearances, is democratic. 4 6 The first-probably the most
obvious-is that although federal judges do not run for office and cannot
easily be turned out of office, they are embedded in a democratic system.
They are selected and confirmed by elected officials. Judicial appointments
can, of course, be used to try to entrench the views of a governing coalition
for some time after the coalition has lost power.47 But at least at the time of
their appointment, most judges will have views that are roughly in line with
48
popular sentiment. In their general outlook and sensibilities, they are likely
to be mainstream figureS49 (which may be good or bad, but is more democratic than the conventional view of judges as "countermajoritarian" actors
would suggest). And even the views of a defunct coalition will probably still
have many adherents.
Also, the judiciary is a multi-member institution; that reduces the
chance that any outliers with truly idiosyncratic views who slip through the
majoritarian appointment process will have a lot of influence. And judges do
not serve forever. They will at least be within a generation or two of the
people who are immediately affected by their decisions-which is more than
can be said about the people who drafted and ratified most of the written
Constitution or participated in the leading candidates for constitutional
moments.
Second, precedent reflects popular sentiment to a degree. That is easy
to see if we consider non-judicial "precedent" that includes developments in
the society as a whole. For example, the decisions interpreting the
Constitution to forbid many forms of discrimination against women could, on
a common law view, legitimately derive support from trends in the larger
society that pointed toward women's equality-changes in nonconstitutional
law, and changes in the economy and the society as well. But even strictly
judicial precedent will have a more difficult time surviving if it is too far out
of touch with popular sentiment. Elected officials will resist precedents that
are highly unpopular-that is, even if the officials obey specific orders from
the courts, they may refuse to recognize some decisions as proper
interpretations of the Constitution unless they are specifically ordered to do

46. Many others have suggested, in various ways, that judicial review is less countermajoritarian than it appears. See, for example, BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: How PUBLIC
OPINION HAS INFLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE
CONSTITUTiON 229-40 (2009); JEFFREY ROSEN, THE MOST DEMOCRATIC BRANCH: HOW THE

COURTS SERVE AMERICA (2006); and Corinna Barrett Lain, Upside-Down Judicial Review, 101
GEO. L.J. 113 (2012).

47. See, e.g., Howard Gillman, PartyPolitics and ConstitutionalChange: The PoliticalOrigins
of Liberal Judicial Activism, in THE SUPREME COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT
138, 138-61 (Ronald Kahn & Ken I. Kirsh eds., 2006).
48. See id. at 142-43 ("[J]udges ... tend to represent the political agenda that was most salient
at the time of their appointment.").
49. See Lain, supra note 46, at 164 ("Like the rest of us, Supreme Court Justices are a product
of their time.").
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so. 50 In addition, unpopular precedents will come under pressure from new
judicial appointees, including judges on lower courts who will implement
them grudgingly. Citizens may also resist them, if they have the opportunity.
All of these forces will tend to keep precedent from drifting too far from
public opinion.
Finally, judicial review itself will become vulnerable if the courts
deviate from public opinion too much and too often. In a generally
democratic system, institutions that are unacceptable to large numbers of
people will have trouble surviving in fact, if not in name. The long-term
general acceptance of judicial review-which, if I am right, operates by
means of a common law-like approach-is a sign that that approach is, at
least, not too objectionable to too many people. Of course, none of these
things demonstrates that a majority of the people always supports judicial
review, or common law constitutionalism, no matter what the courts do. But
majority support is not the point; if it were, judges would be elected the way
legislators and chief executives are. The point is just that there is a
meaningful sense in which common law constitutionalism is democratic.
This last point applies not just to judicial review but to other aspects of
the system-arguably undemocratic elements, like the Senate,5 or elements
that are hard to classify as democratic or not, such as the requirement that
presidential elections be held every four years instead of at some other interval.52 If the system as a whole is broadly responsive to popular sentiment,
then particular elements of the system will not be able to survive if they
encounter massive popular disapproval. Obviously this does not mean they
are ideally democratic, on the assumption that we know what "ideally
democratic" means. But it does put a floor under them; it limits how
undemocratic these institutions can become.
Of course, it is still true that the system can be improved. The
improvements might be done in the name of some specific normative view
about what a well-functioning democracy looks like. So one might argue for
the popular election of the President, for example, in preference to the
Electoral College. In the case of judicial review, the argument would be that
the best conception of democracy requires that the courts defer more to
certain legislative and executive decisions than to others. This kind of
argument prevailed in the mid-1930s, when the Court abandoned economic
due process and began following the approach to the Constitution described

50. See, e.g., BICKEL, supra note 13, at 258-64 (describing reactions of Presidents Jackson,
Lincoln, and Franklin Roosevelt to decisions they disapproved).
51. See LEVINSON, supra note 10 (criticizing the "[i]llIegitimate Senate" for its system of unequal representation and the resultant redistribution of resources from large states to small states).
52. See id at 116-18 (suggesting that the rigidity of the President's term of office may be
undemocratic in light of the inability of fixed terms to guarantee good policy or serve as a measure
of political stability).
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in the Carolene Products footnote. The claim, at the time, was that the
appropriate judicial role in a democracy is the one described in the footnote;
by implication, the approach the Court had been taking before was
insufficiently democratic. To some extent, this revision in the role of the
courts was probably prompted by elite opinion, but the Supreme Court, at
least, also responded to some of the democratic forces I described.5 4 It came
under pressure from popular opinion, and its membership changed; the new
appointees were chosen by a popular president who wanted to recast the
Court's role.
There is no single theory of democracy that is obviously right, and, for
that reason, among others, no single way of establishing, beyond dispute, the
democratic credentials of judicial review and common law constitutionalism.
But those credentials exist. The Constitution that is in the National Archives
was the work of they the people. But the Constitution we actually have-an
evolutionary one, not one that is under glass-actually is, in important ways,
the work of we the people.

53. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (proposing a heightened
standard of judicial review, among other things, for legislation aimed at "discrete and insular
minorities").
54. For a historical discussion of the significant events preceding Carolene Products and the
impact of these events on the Court's jurisprudence, see FRIEDMAN, supra note 46.
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